



Accountability for AI Enabled Systems used in Critical Decision-making

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RESEARCH AND APPLICATION WORKSHOP

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Premise

For concepts that leverage increasingly autonomous systems (including those that are AI-Enabled) to be viable, there needs to be clarity regarding accountability for decisions and outcomes

- **Challenges associated with clearly defining roles and responsibilities for increasingly automated processes**
 - Responsibility, authority, and accountability
- **Stakeholders concerned with accountability**



Authority, Responsibility, and Accountability

✔ ACCOUNTABILITY

The obligation to answer for an action taken by a responsible entity

✔ AUTHORITY

The power to give orders and/or make decisions.

✔ RESPONSIBILITY ¹

The obligation or duty to carry forward an assigned task to its successful conclusion; this is closely coupled to the authority.

- **Today: automation has limited authority and responsibility**
 - Revokable by the human
- **Future: Significantly greater responsibility and authority to make decisions and act, delegated by humans**

Accountability can only reside with a human or human-based organizational entity



1: AC 377, Technical Report #3, "Regulatory Barriers to Autonomy in Aviation", 2022 ASTM, <https://www.astm.org/tr3-eb.html>

7 Principles for Trustworthy AI



<https://www.aepd.es/sites/default/files/2019-12/ai-ethics-guidelines.pdf>




Emphasis on Requirements

- Mechanisms in place to ensure accountability for AI systems and their **outcomes**

Accountability for AI System in Aviation



- “AI may have a degree of control authority over specific flight functions but is not accountable for anything”
- Talks about “Aberrant Behavior” and the need to account



https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/air_cert/step/roadmap_for_AI_safety_assurance

Shifting Decision-Making



Human-centric
decision-making



Accountability Relatively
Straight Forward

Shift to automated
decision-making




Clarity on Accountability
Required

Designer?
Maintainer?
Operator?
Data Provider?

Considerations

- **Root Cause Analysis / Causal Analysis**




**Sequencing
“Chain”**



Adapted from James Reason (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 1997).
Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, September 8, 2010
<https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/313807/000119312510216268/dex993.htm>

- **IDEF**




**Building
Block
Format**



Defense Acquisition University Press, “Systems Engineering Fundamentals”,
 Defense Acquisition University Press, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, January 2001.
<https://acqnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/DAU-Systems-Engineering-Fundamentals.pdf>

Our New Model – Accountability Chain







- **Desired Outcome:** The specific result the functional process is attempting to realize.
- **Functions:** Specific activities that need to be performed to contribute to the desired outcome.
- **Actors:** The individuals or systems that have the authority (power) and responsibility (obligation) to perform a function.
- **Tools:** Capabilities, devices, and systems leveraged by actors to perform the function.
- **Accountable Parties:** While often actors are also the accountable entities, in some cases an organizational entity that manages a system may be the accountable entity.

Conceptual Exploration into Shifts in Conflict Management



eXtensible Traffic Management (XTM)



Automated decision-making
Shared information
Operator responsibility for conflict management
Cooperative operating practices



NASA is Exploring a New Digitally-Enabled Cooperative Operating Mode



Human Centric

Automation Intensive

Human Centric

Visual Flight



Pilot

Flight by Reference to Visual Cues

- Pilot is the separator (see and avoid)
- Limited to no intent sharing
- No conflict management technology required
- Cooperative through human interpretation & judgment
- Limited to no dependence on traffic management


Digitally-Enabled Cooperative Ops



Decision-Maker



Operator



Automation




Operating Environment

Flight by Reference to Digital Capabilities

- Operator is the separator
- Required intent sharing
- Technology-dependent separation function
- Encoded cooperative practices
- Collaborative with traffic management

Instrument Flight




Pilot

ATC


Flight by Reference to Instruments and ATC Services

- Air Traffic Control (ATC) is the separator
- Intent sharing with ATC, not with other IFRs
- Technology dependence (communications, navigation, surveillance)
- Cooperation through centralized control
- Integrated with traffic management

High-level Accountability Analysis for Separation Provision Capability



High-level Accountability Analysis for Maintaining Traffic Situation Awareness under Digital Operations



Maintain Traffic Situation Awareness

Organizational Accountability

- Operator
- ANSP
- 3rd Party

Moving Forward



- **Is clarity associated with accountability a critical barrier to the viability of the use of highly automated system (including AI-enabled systems) in critical operations?**
- **Can the barrier be overcome?**

The *Accountability Chain* methodology could be a means to analyze accountability for increasingly automated operating modes in which multiple parties have interdependent roles



Thank You

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Backups

Detailed Framework for a Digitally Enabled Operating Mode



Info Services & Connectivity



Integrated Information Environment

Maintains a digital model of the operating environment for use by decision-making automation systems



Essential Elements

Information Services & Connectivity

Shared Traffic & Intent Awareness


Cooperative Practices

Automated Conflict Management Capabilities

Shared Traffic & Intent Awareness



Sharing of relevant traffic & intent information for use by automation in conflict management




Cooperative Practices




Governs the behavior of digital operations to ensure harmonized use of the airspace



Automated Capabilities



Automates the critical functions in tactical separation and strategic conflict management



Design Attributes

Safety

Safety Benefits

Embedded Risk Mitigations

Integration

All Airspace Classes

Non-Disruptive to Incumbents

Performance

Tailorable Separation

Aircraft Diversity

Value

Community

Individuals


ICAO Layers of Conflict Management



ICAO Conflict Management ¹	Visual Flight	Digital Flight	Instrument Flight (ATM Services)
Strategic Conflict Management <i>“Achieved through the airspace organization and management, demand and capacity balancing and traffic synchronization components; Aim to reduce the need to apply the second layer — separation provision.”</i>	Procedures, Practices, and Airspace Structure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Traffic Pattern • Ordinal Altitudes • Routes, Flyways 	Traffic Flow Management & Airspace Structure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cooperative compliance (PC-4) • Self organization (PC-5) • Self limiting (PC-6) 	Traffic Flow Management & Airspace Structure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Executed via ATC
Separation Provision <i>“Tactical process of keeping aircraft away from hazards by at least the appropriate separation minima; Only used when strategic conflict management cannot be used efficiently.”</i>	Remain Well Clear Airspace user is the separator for its activity in respect of one or more hazards Visual separation, assisted by technology <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDTI • FLARM 	Self-Separation Airspace user is the separator adhering to a defined minima in respect of one or more hazards <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operator self-separation (PC-1) • Cooperative conflict management (PC-2) • Adaptive pair-wise separation (PC-3) 	Separation Services <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Radar separation • Procedural separation
Collision Avoidance <i>“Must activate when the separation mode has been compromised; Not part of separation provision; Must be compatible with separation provision mode.”</i>	“See” and Avoid <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pilot vision • CDTI – Traffic Alerting • TCAS (in some cases) 	“See” and Avoid <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pilot vision (optional) • TCAS/DAA (in all cases) 	“See” and Avoid <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pilot vision • TCAS/DAA (in most cases)

1: International Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9854, [Global Air Traffic Management Operational Concept](#), First Edition-2005.

Shifting Decision-Making – Digital Operations



- **Dependence Upon Automation**
- **Expansion of Operator Role in Conflict Management**
- **Conflict Management with Instrument Flights**
- **Dependence Upon Information and Connectivity Services**
- **Dependence Upon Operational Intent**

1: Digitally enabled cooperative operations is highly dependent upon automated decision-making, but the issue extends to automated/autonomous flight in general



What is an Operating Mode?

Regulatory, procedural, and technical means for aircraft to **operate safely** within the airspace

aka “*flight rules*” as defined in regulations, policies, procedures, training materials, ...

Routine Operating Modes

Widespread use in most airspace classes
Routine for pilots & controllers

- Visual Flight Rules (VFR)
- Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)

Specialized Operating Modes

Limited to certain operations and/or airspace incompatible with VFR & IFR
Routine for pilots who use them; Nonroutine for controllers and other pilots

- State/Military Aircraft
- Moored Balloons / Kites / Amateur Rockets / Unmanned Free Balloons
- Ultralight Vehicles
- Parachute Operations
- Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems